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Telecommunications and Colonial Rivalry: European 
Telegraph Cables to the Canary Islands and 
Northwest Africa, 1883-1914 
Javier Márquez Quevedo ∗ 
Abstract: »Telekommunikation und kolonialer Wettstreit: Europäische Tele-
graphenkabel zu den Kanarischen Inseln und nach Nordwestafrika, 1883-
1914« The first submarine telegraphic cable which linked the Canary Islands 
with the Spanish mainland was inaugurated in 1883. After only one year, the 
cable reached Senegal, and a decade later, the islands were already connected 
to Brazil. At a first stage the network was exploited by prestigious English and 
French companies which had been in charge of its construction and its techno-
logical aspects. 
Beyond the local socioeconomic significance this first telegraph cable had for 
the local society, the Canary Islands, given their geostrategical situation, be-
came a stage for the rivalry between the European countries as regards the 
colonisation of Africa. Part of the communications with Northwest Africa, and 
with South America, had a necessary intermediate landing site on the islands. 
Issues regarding the ownership of the network, the control of its functioning or 
the possibility of its interruption were vital for the imperialist projects of West-
ern powers in their open competition with each other. Telegraph cables are a 
good example of the degree of intervention to which this geographical area was 
subjected by industrial capitalist countries. 
This article analyses the way in which this telecommunications system influ-
enced the geopolitical situation of the Canary Islands and their African hinter-
land. Also, it deals with the hidden fights between the European powers in 
their quest to hold control of this system, as well as the resulting pressure the 
Spanish government experienced in the pre-First World War years. 
Keywords: Telegraph, submarine cables, Atlantic Ocean, Africa, Canary Is-
lands, imperialism. 
The Geopolitical Context 
The international competition for taking control over the northwest part of 
Africa was intensified during the last decades of the 19th century. This area 
covered a vast maritime-terrestrial territory which stretched from the Azores to 
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Morocco and from Madeira and the Canaries to Senegal and Cape Verde. The 
European colonial powers competed for its main strategic resources through 
priority rights over mining production or through the concessions for new 
channels of communication: ports, railways and telegraph cables. 
After 1900, the Franco-German rivalry in Morocco and Western Sahara in-
creased. Since then, German traders also flocked to the Canaries. Their inter-
ests had increased considerably and their companies and productions became 
significant competitors to those of British capitalists. The trade boost also led 
them to Madeira, the Azores or Cape Verde, in an attempt to control its tele-
graphic or maritime communications. 
Germany tried to attain a position in the Azores, Madeira, the Canaries and 
Morocco avoiding a head-on crash with Great Britain. As the Portuguese is-
lands turned out to be a hard assignment, Berlin determined to focus on the 
Canaries – a decision that crashed with the sensitivity of the English, who 
harshly criticised it.1 The latter thought it their duty to prevent the archipelago 
from becoming an enemy base by granting several “peaceful” advantages such 
as telegraphic cables, coal deposits or radio stations. 
Telegraphy arrived at the Canaries quite soon compared to the technological 
development of the region. Ports and submarine cables were the technical and 
industrial features which stood out in these small backward islands supported 
on an agrarian economic scheme. It is not a coincidence that the British were 
responsible for the construction and, at the same time, the main beneficiaries, 
since the mid-Atlantic islands played a substantial role in the imperialist pro-
jects in Africa. The Daily Mail even reported that the government of the Free 
State of Congo was negotiating a deal on the archipelago with Madrid.2 It was 
said that King Leopold of Belgium planned to buy the islands in order to use 
them as a sanatorium and coaling station. 
In France it was believed that England would probably occupy the Canaries 
in case of a naval war, mainly to prevent another foreign power to do it. Con-
cerns also rose over the German strategies in the North of Africa.3 The navy 
had settled down in the port of Mogador at Morocco’s Atlantic coast, very 
close to the Spanish archipelago. Moreover, its worried competitors were care-
fully watching the German trade offensive on Fernando Poo Island and the 
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Eastern Atlantic. It was even said that Spain would sell them the Guinean is-
land.4 
The Woermann-Linie, with its factories located in Bata and Elobey, was the 
soundest among the four German firms operating in Spanish Guinea, north of 
Gabon. It had invested a significant amount of capital there and carried out a 
very active domestic trade with the native traders from the hinterland, a place 
not many Europeans had ever reached. It was even capable of competing with 
English companies such as Holt or Hatton & Cookson, which had already been 
in that area for a long time. The French and British conquerors considered it a 
significant menace, especially when it finally managed to control the smug-
gling of rubber, which was cheaply delivered from the north coast by the con-
voy coming from the Ivindo basin. Thus having a coaling station and a cable 
landing base in the Canaries would generate benefits for the German firm. 
Telegraph cables are also a good example of the European interventionism 
in the kingdom of Morocco. Spain watched closely and with great concerns 
how Western capitalism entered this country, as it had an impact on the stabil-
ity of its southern frontiers.5 At the end of the 19th century, Morocco was al-
ready connected with the rest of the world – just via English cables. This led to 
the fact that in 1894 the death of the Sultan could be hushed up for a day and a 
half – time enough for London to guarantee its interests. France complained 
bitterly about this. 
In 1887, the English Eastern Telegraph Company had managed to lay a ca-
ble between Gibraltar and Tangier. Only years later, France would link itself 
Marseille, Oran and Tangier by a strategic network. In order to get rid of the 
Franco-British pressure, the Sultan of Morocco endeavoured to strengthen the 
friendship with Germany while imposing restrictions on companies of other 
European powers.6 So this, the creation of a territorial area of German influ-
ence, was an essential factor to which England and France would tenaciously 
oppose. 
The underlying issue, which is studied in this article, is how the submarine 
telegraph cables became a subject of intense rivalry between Germany and the 
new Franco-British entente. The Canary Islands were one of the scenes where 
this struggle took place. The Germans tried to use the islands in order to link 
their cables to the Atlantic Africa and even considered the possibility of enter-
ing the telegraphic communication of Morocco, which was then under an in-
creasing French influence. 
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Therefore, France and especially Britain tried to prevent or hinder the laying 
of these German cables. First, they tried to put pressure on Spain forcing it to 
refuse a German landing in Tenerife. Then they impeded an extension to Africa 
and South America. The governments of Paris and London could not maintain 
their cablegraphic monopoly in this area, which was broken by the German 
cable construction between Emden and the Canaries. Nevertheless, they did 
determine the Spanish prohibition of establishing an extension between the 
islands and Morocco. 
Telegraph Cables between the Canaries and Africa 
After the war in 1898, the USA decided to keep the island of Guam because of 
its valuable role as a coaling station on the route to Japan, China, Korea and the 
Philippines but also wanted to establish a location to land the transpacific tele-
graph cable. As a result of the war between Spain and the USA, every nation 
strove for owning the lines that connected its many territories. The control over 
communications became another element to stress the rivalry among European 
powers, giving rise to the so-called submarine cables war. At this, new imperi-
alist nations quarrelled, such as the USA or Germany. 
In this period there were about six submarine cables in the Atlantic Ocean 
and two large African systems: that of Aden-Zanzibar-Mozambique-Durban, in 
Eastern Africa, and that of Lisbon-Madeira to Accra, in the Gold Coast. Accra 
and Durban city were connected straight to Cape Town, where both systems 
were joined.7 Great Britain played a dominant role in this network. It was in 
control of the main telegraphic market, that of the North Atlantic area. When 
German and French companies wanted to compete with the British ones, they 
therefore had to approach their governments; they even had to turn into private 
companies but just in name.8 
In Spain, the national network of electric telegraphy was developed in the 
second half of the 19th century.9 The first submarine cable that linked the Ca-
naries and the Iberian Peninsula was officially opened in 1883. A year later, it 
had already been extended to Saint-Louis in Senegal, through a link to the 
French cable of Western Africa. The connection was operated by the English 
Spanish National Submarine Telegraph Cº. In 1893, the Spanish authorities 
recovered the management of the cable between Cadiz and Tenerife Island. The 
repairs were granted – regardless of the company running the landing – to the 
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English India Rubber Gutta Percha and Telegraph Cº, which was supervised 
by a parliamentary committee. 
In 1892, the telegraph line Tenerife-Saint-Louis was stretched to Recife, 
former Pernambuco, in Brazil, by another English company: The South Ameri-
can Cable Cº. This firm was later acquired by the French government. How-
ever, the attempt to lay a line from Tenerife to Havana, also connecting 
Vieques Island, next to Puerto Rico, never thrived. The implementation of this 
project was decided shortly before the 1898 war. Since the budget was far from 
covering such excessive costs, there was no bidding. The project was thwarted 
as Spanish foreign policy was now focused on northwestern Africa instead of 
America, which was already considered to be lost. At the same time the line of 
Saint-Louis, and later that of Dakar, were connected to another British cable 
owned by the Eastern Telegraph Company, which reached Bathurst, that is, 
Banjul, in Gambia. 
The telegraphic communication network in western French Africa was com-
pleted in 1903. The main line was laid from the coast of Senegal to Say, at the 
Niger River. And from that point, it branched out towards Guinea, the Ivory 
Coast and Benin, formerly Dahomey. Thus, the most relevant cities and settle-
ments of the French colonies in black Africa were connected by telegraph lines 
to the general governor of Dakar and among themselves. France had strove 
hard for laying and acquiring its own cables with the purpose of being com-
pletely independent from foreign lines. From Konakri and Grand Bassam, at 
the Ivory Coast, its network reached to remote Libreville, capital city of French 
Congo.10 
The major drawback for them was the lack of a direct cable which con-
nected the metropolis with Western Africa. France only had the control over 
the Saint- Louis cable up to the Canaries. And, in fact, the branch of Saint-
Louis-Yoff Bay-Dakar was owned by India Rubber. Until 1904 these lines 
made up the main connection between France and Senegal. In order to solve 
this problem a new cable from Brest to Dakar was introduced, which finally re-
established the network as a French product. 
Germany wanted to have a similar network for its African colonies. In Janu-
ary, 1900, the French consulate in Württemberg warned about what the Ber-
liner Tageblatt was stating: the imperial government planned to lay a subma-
rine cable from the Canaries and Cape Verde to western German Africa and 
connect that point to the Indian coast by an overland line crossing the Belgian 
Congo.11 It was the first time this European power showed interest in the Afri-
can cables issue. 
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The colonial lobbies from England and France were concerned about the ar-
rival of German telegraph companies to Morocco. In Fez, at the end of 1906, 
an engineer, expert on wireless telegraphy and ballooning, tried to recruit na-
tive work force. Berlin insisted on having a coaling station and a telegraphic 
link in the mid-Atlantic, although Portugal did not allow it to consider Madeira 
as an option.12 
Therefore, the Atlantic archipelagos were essential strategic points for inter-
continental telegraphic connections. The struggle for getting the control over 
these lines stimulated British diplomacy to negotiate a treaty which secured 
British priority in the area. Its aim was to achieve, first from Portugal and then 
from Spain, an unmistakable commitment to not give concessions or transfer 
national rights or properties to a third party, especially, with regard to ports and 
cables. 
The German Projects over the Telegraphic Cables in 
Atlantic Africa: The End of the Anglo-French Monopoly 
When, early in the 20th century, the German Government wanted to lay a sub-
marine cable to connect with their colonies in Atlantic Africa and with the 
South American countries, it was found out that the area between the Azores, 
the Canaries and Morocco was kept for British and French cables. However, 
Germany did not renounce this goal, which was central to the colonial aspira-
tions. This is the reason why they started negotiations with the Spanish gov-
ernment about the Canary Islands as a first station for its submarine cable land-
ing. 
The German cable network advanced across the world and had put the 
Shangai-Yap-Manado-Guam telegraph system into operation. This route linked 
the German territories in Eastern Asia to the Dutch part of the East Indies, and 
was, by another section, connected via the American cable in the Pacific Ocean 
with the transatlantic German line to the metropolis. Thus, it seemed obvious to 
plan the extension of the cables towards the South Atlantic. In order to com-
plete this global network, Germany focused on South America and western 
Africa.13 
The progressive development of German protectorates in Togo, Cameroon 
and south western Africa, the relevance of economic interests which have not 
been treated yet, and the need of an organized management required a cable 
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connection to the metropolis safe from foreign powers. An example of this are 
the lines to south western Africa, which Germany had to rent from the British. 
The most profitable way to lay a cable to Brazil or to western Africa – from 
a technical and financial point of view – would have been to place it in Portu-
gal, Madeira and the Cape Verde Islands. However, the English Western Tele-
graph Company, which owned the Lisbon-Madeira-Saint Vincent-Pernambuco 
cable, had received from the Portuguese government the monopoly over the 
connection between Portugal, the aforementioned islands and Brazil. 
The option of laying a branch from the Azores and southwards could not be 
taken into account either (on Fayal Island a cable from Deutsch-Atlantische 
Telegraphengesellschaft (DAT) was landed) because the Portuguese govern-
ment did not give the requested special permission, due to its commitment to 
Western Telegraph. 
In order to overcome the difficulties caused by the British monopoly it was 
even proposed to send the cables directly to their destination, which turned out 
to be technically impossible. After all, the German attempt to communicate 
through the English companies located in Portuguese territory failed as well. 
Berlin knew perfectly well that Great Britain would hinder the execution of the 
German plan either in an obvious or a secret way. 
Given the circumstances the most advisable action for the German govern-
ment was to connect the metropolis with South America and western Africa via 
the Canary Islands. This connection was less favourable from the technical 
point of view, due to the greater length of the cable, but on the other hand it 
also promised to be useful route if it was properly laid. 
A direct cable connection between Germany and the Iberian Peninsula al-
ready existed, the Emden-Vigo line. It had been built in 1896 by Deutsche See-
Telegraphengesellschaft and at the end of 1904 the Imperial Post Office forced 
DAT – founded in Cologne in 1899 – to buy it. Initially the Emden-Vigo cable 
was meant to connect Germany to North America; but the route via the Azores 
seemed to be more suitable to link Emden to New York. DAT had been in 
charge of finishing that telegraphic project. But apart from this, the Emden-
Vigo cable was becoming more and more important due to its annual increase 
of traffic. 
Apart from the main connection Vigo-Tenerife, Germany was speculating 
about the possibility of “later” extending a branch towards the Moroccan coast. 
They were almost sure that the French opposition would make some noise 
against a German connection in Tenerife. The Cadiz-Tenerife cable had been 
working before 1906 as a relevant link between the French cables of Marseille-
Oran-Tangier-Cadiz and Tenerife-Saint Louis in Senegal. 
The Imperial Government thought its plan would, in spite of all handicaps, 
succeed. After achieving an independent system thanks to the recently laid 
cable from Brest to Dakar, France considered the relevance of Tenerife as 
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strategic point on cable landings to have decreased. Furthermore, Germany did 
not aspire at all to get a monopoly of telegraphic lines in the Canaries. 
The cable arrived at Tenerife at the first stage of the project. There, the con-
tract with the Spanish government would make clear the need of continuing 
southward, so later, when the necessary landing rights of some other places 
were acquired, they could easily face the expected difficulties. The company in 
charge of building the cable, Felten und Guilleaume, from Mülheim-am-Rhein, 
would be supported by a powerful financial consortium. 
From the German point of view, the Canaries’ significance as a transit area 
would then increase, and the Spanish Atlantic enclaves would have a powerful 
telegraphic connection. Considering these advantages, Germany hoped that the 
Spanish government would agree with its projects. 
The Cables “War”: 
The Anglo-French Opposition to the German Telegraphic 
Project between Emden and the Canaries 
Germany gave a new boost to its telegraphic project and announced its inten-
tion to negotiate with Spain a line between Emden and the Canaries. This ac-
tion provoked a fierce opposition by the governments of France and Great 
Britain, and by the affected British companies as well. The matter may be 
understood as a real economic and diplomatic “war” with obvious implications 
for the future. 
Only when the Algeciras Conference was over, the government of the Kai-
ser asked the Spanish authority to negotiate a contract to lay a telegraph cable 
from the Emden enclave – in the North Sea – to the Canaries, which, in princi-
ple would have a halfway link in Vigo. This happened in April 1906. 
The German decision of connecting its colonies by telegraph with its own 
system revolutionized the communications prospect in the northwest of Africa. 
What until 1905 had been a field ruled by two complete opposites, the British 
and the French securing a certain counterweight regarding the route and the use 
of the service, would be altered by the trade war between the new western 
allied and Berlin. 
In summer 1906, the German cable-ship Grossherzog von Oldenbourg 
stayed several days in Las Palmas. During this period it made some test drill-
ings at the landing point of the Gran Canaria-Lanzarote cable. 
The French consulate put forward that a hydrographical study would be un-
dertaken about a cable from Emden that hooked in the Azores, would touch the 
Canaries and then extend to Cameroon and other colonies in German western 
Africa.14 
                                                             
14  CADN: Consulat à Las Palmas, Série B/8. 
 116
A German company had also proposed to the Spanish government to repair 
and complete the internal telegraphic connections between the Canary Islands, 
in exchange for the permission to land “its cable” in the archipelago. Some 
months before the European press had announced that the cabinet of the Kaiser 
had already decided to set up a line to Africa, that they would not wait for the 
Canaries to be one of their stations, and eventually this line would compete 
with the new French cable from Brest to Dakar. 
The British expressed their concern for the first time to the Spanish author-
ity in a note verbale about the German project. Their ambassador Maurice De 
Bunsen sent it to the Spanish Minister of State on 10 July 1906. In this, Madrid 
was requested to suspend any decision about the landing of a telegraph cable in 
the Canaries for the moment. The English and the French were sure that Spain 
would cooperate with them against the German projects. In turn, the Spanish 
government tried to delay the decision on the German proposal as much as 
possible. The successive cabinet changes in 1906, a politically unstable year, 
contributed to this. 
The French consulate in the Canaries maximized the surveillance over the 
actions of the German ship, in order to send a detailed report of its stay as soon 
as possible. Every inquiry was to be done confidentially, but Paris also con-
tacted the Spanish State Department to warn it: the first step towards the col-
lapse of the “balance” enjoyed among the European powers regarding to com-
munication networks, was taking place. Thus, the French diplomacy gave fresh 
impetus to the efforts of achieving a Hispanic-French agreement on the North-
west part of Africa. The design of a new telegraphic status quo, beneficial for 
both sides, was considered. 
The reports of the British Board of Trade were quite clear about the German 
cables. These would seriously harm the interests of Great Britain and France. 
The cable would mean a fatal competition for the Cadiz-Tenerife line, for that 
from Brest to Dakar, and for the routes by Madeira and Noronha as well. Like-
wise, it would mean for Spain losing the benefits which resulted from the Al-
geciras Conference, especially the international support that both France and 
Great Britain provided. 
The Board of Trade was wondering if for Madrid a landing rights guarantee 
to Germany was worth the sacrifice of that new diplomatic position. And fi-
nally, it speculated that these landing rights might be a bad precedent whereby 
other governments or companies might apply for any kind of “absurd conces-
sions.”15 
The British Admiralty came to the conclusion that the requested cable was 
very important from a strategic point of view and that “it would lead to the 
undesirable strengthening of the German communications in the case of war.”16 
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It advised its government to make a counteroffer, that is, laying a cable be-
tween the Iberian Peninsula, Madeira and the Canaries. The idea of connecting 
the Spanish archipelago to Madeira and Saint Vincent was also part of an alter-
native plan presented by Eastern Telegraph Cº. 
The Germans, too, had the support from the Spanish Navy Department and 
from other State agencies, which by the way, encouraged the Germans to use 
the diplomatic channels. For these pro-German, the project from Felten would 
improve the opportunities of the Spanish outside communication, especially 
with the Canary Islands and to the South American republics. Regarding the 
latter, they counted on significant economic interests of the Spanish emigrants. 
Besides, the European colonies in Southern Africa were undergoing a great 
commercial expansion and this made it tempting to combine telegraphy and 
shipping towards this area.17 
At first, Eastern Telegraph Cº wanted to act unilaterally. In those days it 
was the most important cable company in the world. It offered to build a new 
cable between Cadiz and the Canaries free of charge. In return, it would control 
exclusively the construction of other telegraph cables from the islands to the 
mainland or to any foreign territory. India Rubber also tried to take advantage 
of this situation by offering its services in exchange for the rights of the tele-
graphic communications with the Canaries, except for the French cable to 
Senegal. There was no connection between this offer and the one submitted by 
Eastern Telegraph Cº. Both companies were determined to compete hard with 
each other. 
Nevertheless, political interests have priority over the free market laws. In 
order to stifle the German initiative taken on the field of submarine cables, the 
allied European nations tried to establish a front company which would enable 
them to keep the telegraphic communications between the Canaries and west-
ern Africa as a monopoly. In order to carry out this project, an offer to the 
Spanish government would be drawn up through a political and business plot 
which would gather the English, French and Spanish shareholders. The idea 
started from a private initiative and was supported by the British and French 
governments. 
A company of shareholders called Compañía Cablegráfica Española would 
be created which would then establish a public contract with the government of 
Madrid. The company would be “Spanish” in name and would be constituted 
according to the law of this country. Any English or French reference in its 
name was omitted. It would have the exclusive rights to lay cables from the 
Iberian Peninsula, the Canaries and the Spanish territories in western Africa to 
any other foreign area. 
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The intention was obvious: this “company” offered to the Spanish govern-
ment to set, free of charge, a cable between Cadiz and the Canaries in exchange 
for being granted the monopoly over all the telegraph landings starting from 
Spanish territory to north western Africa. The document for the creation of 
Compañía Cablegráfica Española was prepared by the managers of Eastern 
Telegraph Company and a senior official of the French administration. The 
agreement contained a secret clause in order to prevent Spain from hindering 
France to exercise its right of property over a cable between the Canaries and 
Morocco.18 
According to its developers, the agreement would result in the consolidation 
of “the natural relationship of Spain with France and England, as they all were 
undertaken to the Morocco’s issue.” The French and the British had agreed to 
state to the Spanish government that both power’s interests were brought into 
agreement. And the cables issue was extremely important. Thus, the landing of 
a German cable in Morocco would be an injurious situation for them. During 
the previous months, French had lobbied hard. From that moment, though, 
London was to take over the main role in this matter. 
However, the Spanish government declined the offer from the so-called 
Compañía Cablegráfica Española. This would have meant to prejudice the 
legitimate German aspirations to get a cable landing in the Canaries. The Sec-
retary of State, Manuel Allendesalazar, confirmed that the cable issue was a 
delicate matter to Spain. His opinion was that “an acceptable solution for eve-
ryone” could be reached, that is, to reconcile the German ambitions with the 
“Spanish” political and sovereignty interests, through some effective guaran-
tees.19 Allendesalazar clearly saw that they were stuck in a very difficult situa-
tion and that it would be quite hard for his government to please everyone. 
Contrary to what may be thought, he wrote to his ambassador in Berlin that it 
would be the Spanish interests – not the outside pressure – which would decide. 
The common position of France and Great Britain in this issue came to an 
end after the failure of that strategy. France stated that its interest on the issue 
of cables in the Canaries had been reduced to a single point: to prevent the 
German cable to extend to Morocco. If Berlin relinquished the extension, there 
would not be any other reason to object to the German request to the Spanish 
government. England could only hope that the telegraph cable that was in-
tended for the Canaries would not compete with its lines between Europe and 
South America. 
Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, would find himself in a se-
rious predicament if he had to veto the German request and come into a conflict 
with the Kaiser government. The first questions in Grey’s department about the 
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advisability of keeping a strong opposition towards the German cable had 
emerged in early 1907. If at that moment, Germany only wanted to lay an oce-
anic cable, this attitude would seem a provocation. Grey proposed that a re-
stricted agreement between Berlin and Madrid would be “the best available 
solution.”20 Furthermore, if Spain were capable to resist the French and British 
lobbying, in those days it would be better for London to accept the situation 
than to oppose and fail. 
As hard to believe as it might seem, a tacit agreement in this conflict be-
tween Great Britain and Germany was possible. The English companies would 
be still monopolizing the cable between Cadiz and the Canaries, but they also 
would accept his rival’s right to land in the islands, leaving out the north part of 
Africa.21 This matter would be solved following only political criteria, not 
economic. Nevertheless, the French position was still strong and would have to 
be taken into account in order to have a final determination. 
The UK would accept to grant a landing to Germany on three conditions: 
first, Germany should desist from extending this cable to Morocco. Secondly, 
this cable should directly connect Emden and the Canaries without a halfway 
landing in Vigo. This would push the construction costs up and would reduce 
its capacity of work. Therefore the cable would not be as competitive and Ger-
many could not cut prices. The argument used was that national security did 
not allow a foreign company to link two Spanish cities telegraphically. How-
ever, the English companies did have cables between Marseille and Algeria or 
Turkey and Egypt. Some more British cables in the Far East or in America or 
even some French or American lines were under the same circumstances. Fi-
nally, Berlin would have the landing but would not have the right to set up a 
telegraphic station on the islands. This involved a thorough revision on the total 
opposition policy which had been followed up to these days. It also provided 
the Spanish government some relief. 
In March 1907 Madrid made an initial offer to Germany that included the 
British terms. The conditions imposed by the Foreign Office in order to ap-
prove the cable to Tenerife were analyzed in France. The first one was very 
clear and accurate; it satisfied the French government main whish. Even then, 
the French experts concluded that their telegraphic interests were not protected 
enough under the conditions drawn by London. 
The German tried to prevent, unsuccessfully, a direct cable between Emden 
and the Canaries, which made them to submerge 1200 miles of heavy cable. 
They always suspected that the English lobbying was behind the Spanish firm-
ness. The Spanish ambassador in Berlin had to convince the German govern-
ment that lobbying was not the reason for the Spanish attitude. Madrid author-
ized to extend the Tenerife cable to a point on the African coast below the 7º 
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parallel north latitude and to another point in South America. In turn, the Span-
ish government would renew its request already done in 1902 to link Cameroon 
and Fernando Po Island with a German cable. 
Finally, Berlin accepted the conditions. The landing point in Africa was es-
tablished in the Republic of Liberia. Germany could not longer allow itself to 
depend on foreign cable sections for its Atlantic communications.22 Although it 
was much more expensive, Germany would finally opt for a direct cable with 
the Canaries. Allendesalazar concluded that the matter was “virtual and prop-
erly done. Whatever they said, the ‘favour’ was of great importance. It would 
provide the German companies a powerful way to compete with other coun-
tries.” Nevertheless, the resignation that Germany showed when accepting the 
conditions and even its commitment to not insist ever was a surprise for the 
Spanish government. In Madrid they were afraid of the Germans competing 
again in the future. 
The agreement was described by France as a serious attack to its interests. 
The penetration of the German telegraphic lines in the South Atlantic meant a 
great failure for them. As it was considered a fait accompli, they had to focus 
on reducing its effects. In this context, it seemed advisable to set up a French 
submarine connection between the Canaries and the coast of Morocco, and to 
test the possibilities of connecting the cable from Saint-Louis to Tenerife with 
the Tangier-Oran-Marseille network. The idea was having its own safe channel 
just in case the Brest-Dakar cable failed. 
Rumours about the cable were still circulating in spite of the agreement. It 
was said that a German company was negotiating with the Spanish government 
the construction of a cable line between Spain and Morocco as well as Guinea. 
It was also commented that the Emden-Tenerife line would cross the Atlantic 
Ocean and America to finally connect with the transpacific cables. It was also 
said that the Reich had appealed to the Algeciras Conference, as it would have 
acquired the right to land a cable in Maghreb on equal terms as Spain, France 
and England.23 
In August 1907, the Spanish government would seal a pact with Paris and 
London in order to “never” assign the telegraphic link between the Canaries 
and Morocco to any “foreign” company. In order to face Berlin’s decision 
taking the cable to South America, France conceived a last anti-German strat-
egy. The plan involved to go ahead by offering to link Dakar and Pernambuco 
through the Canaries. This would result in a main line between Brazil and the 
west coast of Africa, which would make the Brazilian government to doubt the 
profitability of the German offering. 
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In late 1908 the Emden-Tenerife line was officially opened. In Berlin this 
achievement was given a great relevance. They talked proudly about the 
worldwide German network and the link to other areas where they had many 
important trade interests.24 Even though the setting up of the cable had been 
awarded to Felten und Guilleaume, it was DAT which finally laid and operated 
it from 1909 on. 
The ambition of the German projects was restricted by the English and 
French lobbying. Accepting the final Spanish offer was the only option left. 
However, the Reich wanted to compete with the British communications sys-
tem as a short-term objective. It had opened the way to complete its own 
worldwide network. 
Conclusions 
The concessions for telegraphic landings granted to foreign powers had lead to 
a worsening of the Spanish interests. Because of that, Spain could not enjoy the 
benefits that the telegraphic circulation would have originated due to its unique 
geographical situation. For instance, the line to Dakar – which usually transmit-
ted a very significant amount of messages to the west of Africa – was out of its 
control. However, due to its own weakness in the imperialist context, it was 
unable to get rid of those requests. 
The German government put hard pressure on the Spanish Administration in 
order to make it consent to the cable in the Canaries. The lobbying turned into 
threats to such an extent that Berlin could refuse the extension of its commer-
cial agreement with Spain, and replace it by “war” duties. But the German 
harshness towards Spain was softened during 1907, and the Commercial Treaty 
about the Most Favoured Nation was finally signed by both countries after the 
resolution of the cable issue. 
The Canaries could play a role similar to that of the Azores regarding the 
German cables. The Portuguese islands were the link of the telegraphic com-
munications to North America, while the Spanish archipelago would be the link 
to South America and all the colonies in the west coast of Africa: Togo, Cam-
eroon and Walfisch Bay or Swakopmund, in south western Africa.25 With 
regards to communications with Africa, Berlin could even count on the col-
laboration of Portugal and Belgium, as the Portuguese colonies and the Congo 
would profit in the future from a link to German territories. 
The French telegraph system in the Atlantic was simpler than that owned by 
the English companies. But it was not managed by private companies. It was a 
state property, operated by the government and its profits were invested in the 
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Exchequer. Due to its routes of the lines, to South America or Brazil, the 
French system could be proportionally more threatened than the British cables. 
The recent cable Brest-Dakar and its extensions to the Congo and Brazil 
were not the only ones threatened by the German project. The German cable 
system would include – besides the direct lines from its metropolis to Western 
Africa and South America – another section which from Brazil was meant to 
connect to the Emden cable in New York. This new competitor caused deep 
concern for the Compagnie Française des Câbles, which was operating in the 
Antilles and in the USA with French state capital. 
In the opinion of the French government, the success of the German project 
would throw entire years of Moroccan and African policies overboard. The 
main reason for France to purchase the Brazil cable from South American Cº 
was to prevent it from becoming a German property. This involved a signifi-
cant economic effort in order to struggle against Germany in the Atlantic. 
However, with the passing of time, the rivalry between France and Germany 
regarding the submarine cables tended to get mitigated, paradoxically few 
years before the World War. In 1910 Paris and Berlin would connect their 
systems through a cable branch between Brest and Emden, sharing a Euro-
African line. Both European powers had agreed to merge their projects in the 
South Atlantic towards Brazil, Togo and Cameroon. This would benefit both 
sides commercially despite the public opinion from both countries that did not 
trust in these agreements in middle of the Moroccan crisis that almost led them 
to war26. 
Great Britain lobbied as well. First, they claimed the withdrawal of the con-
cession of the cable to the Canaries and then the restriction of its conditions. 
The Foreign Office paid as much attention as the French did to the decisions on 
the submarine cable issue made by Berlin. The British telegraph companies 
were the first to raise the alarm on this matter. Since 1875 Eastern and Western 
Telegraph Company monopolized the cables service in the west and south of 
Africa, as in Brazil and Argentina. They took advantage of the landing monop-
oly that Portugal had granted them over all its territories. That is exactly what 
they were trying to achieve in Spain, but could not. 
Sir Francis Bertie, British ambassador in Paris, was among the first advo-
cates of the Anglo-Spanish collaboration. He considered that the interests of the 
British companies and their investments in the telegraph industry, were an 
argument good enough to stop the hiring applied by Germany. In his opinion, 
the global needs and the threat to the balance of powers themselves justified an 
agreement with the government of Madrid27. 
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The British wanted to have a good negotiator in Madrid who could spur the 
Spanish signing a guarantee agreement with them. This would keep Germany 
away from the Spanish islands. In exchange, they would guarantee security in 
Gibraltar, what represented a key factor in the Anglo-Spanish relationship. As 
Portugal and France were under the British scope, Germany only had the Span-
ish or Dutch territories left to try to obtain some coaling stations and telegraph 
landing points. 
The possibility of landing a German cable in Morocco was a matter of ex-
treme concern for the British. Its reports stated constantly that the true German 
aim was to land a cable in the Moroccan west coast, probably in Casablanca. 
This would work as a starting point for a telegraphic network that surrounded 
the entire country. Thus, Germany would develop a public works plan in the 
north of Morocco with direct assistance from Spain. 
However, the option of lying a cable to Morocco – a real obsession of the 
British and French in 1906 and 1907 – did not seem to be an inescapable prior-
ity to the Imperial government, at least during those years. This does not mean 
that Germany would not try it several times, for instance, in 1909, during the 
negotiations for a Hispanic-German agreement about Morocco. In this process 
Germany requested to extend its cable from the Canaries, which was not ac-
cepted. 
The German cable could not only cause the British telegraph companies se-
rious harm, but especially was a very important threat to Britain’s naval su-
premacy. The experts of the Foreign Office thought that the intention of the 
German company was to damage the “universal predominance” that Great 
Britain had over the submarine telegraphic communications and that they 
would spare no resources. A German cable between the Canaries, or Monrovia, 
and Brazil would extend to the USA, completing a global circuit. The political 
influence of Berlin would be reinforced then. This would involve for the Ger-
man merchant navy to enjoy the security that the configuration of the tele-
graphic world system had only provided to UK during the 19th century. 
The initial wish of Grey’s government had been to turn the Canaries into a 
copy of Madeira, that is, to pact with Spain the monopoly of the British com-
panies over the cables in the islands. But the global circumstances were not the 
same any more and this pact never took place. The Eastern Telegraph Cº and 
other British companies from the telegraph industry had to resign when its 
German competitors entered in a trading area hitherto controlled by them. 
German achievements in telegraphy made Great Britain to come to its own 
conclusions in order to face the future28. It was desirable for the Imperial De-
fence Department to isolate all the German colonies as much as possible. In 
case of total war, the connection to Cameroon would be cut off immediately 
                                                             
28  “Committee of Imperial Defence. Report of Submarine Cable Communications in Time of 
War. Secret. 1911,” NA: CAB 16/14. 
 124
from the kingdom of Bonny. What is more, all the cables with direct connec-
tion to Germany, including Vigo and Tenerife, would have to be cut off as 
well. The most appropriate formula to do this would be using cable-ships in the 
English Channel. Neither Spain nor Liberia could stop these cuts. This would 
also work for the cable from Monrovia to Pernambuco. 
Thus, the control over the cables in north western Africa was an extremely 
significant matter discussed in depth at the highest level. It prompted the revi-
sion of the strategic value of the Atlantic archipelagos. The imperialist rivalry 
over this issue contributed to the escalation of the tension before the war. This 
represented a political and technological confrontation that reached one of its 
decisive moments between 1905 and 1914 on the days prior to the Great War. 
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